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Less is More in International Private Law
Susan BLOCK-LIEB* and Terence C. HALLIDAY**

Introduction
1 For nearly a hundred years, efforts to unify, harmonize or coordinate private law
consisted of the drafting of a diplomatic convention that would enter into force
once a specified number of countries had acceded to its terms. 1 Conventions might
look to regulate private interaction within a specified (substantive) issue area, or
only specific (procedural) interactions involving resolution of disputes arising
between private parties. The choice between public and private international law,
and between a focus on substance and procedure, were the limited formal strategies
employed in the making of international private laws in the early twentieth century.2
2 Since the late 1960s, international law-making organizations, especially the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”), have
drawn from a widening range of formal strategies that include choosing among
model laws, legislative guides, statements of principles, recommendations or rules,
as well as the drafting of purely explanatory texts. In our forthcoming book, Global
Legislators, we explore UNCITRAL’s increasing reliance on a broad array of
formal strategies.3 Our examination focuses mostly on three case studies involving

* Susan Block-Lieb is the Cooper Family Chair in Urban Legal Studies at the Fordham Law School.
** Terence C. Halliday is Senior Research Professor at the American Bar Foundation.
1
S. Block-Lieb and T. Halliday, “Contracts and Private Law in the Emerging Ecology of International
Law-making”, in G. Mallard and J. Sgard (eds), Contracting beyond Borders: The Law of
International Markets in the Twentieth Century (forthcoming 2016).
2
H.C. Gutteridge, Comparative Law: An Introduction to the Comparative Method of Legal Study and
Research, Chapter XI (1946, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) (generally addressing movement
for unification of private law); H.C. Gutteridge, “The Technique of the Unification of Private Law”
(1939) 20 British Yearbook of International Law 37-51. The choices between international public and
private law-making, and between the drafting of laws governing procedure and substance, remain valid
today. See Block-Lieb and Halliday, above note 1 (discussing the history of the Hague Conference on
Private International Law, the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law – UNIDROIT,
the UN’s International Law Commission – ILC, and its Commission on International Trade Law –
hereafter referred to as “UNCITRAL”).
3
S. Block-Lieb and T. Halliday, Global Legislators: Producing Commercial Laws for the World,
Chapter 6 (forthcoming 2016).
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UNCITRAL’s production of Legislative Guides on Insolvency4 and Secured
Transactions Laws5 and of a draft Convention on Contracts for the International
Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea6 and, thus, on two sorts of technologies
(e.g., legislative guides and conventions). Chapter 6 of this forthcoming book finds
that these strategies permit flexibility along five axes: discretion; audience; detail;
and breadth. We argue that this flexibility aids UNCITRAL internally in achieving
consensus on texts drafted by its working groups and ratified by its governing
assembly. It also, we contend, serves important functions external to the legislative
chamber, both in terms of a State’s willingness and ability to implement
UNCITRAL texts and UNCITRAL’s centrality to the general ecology of
international law-making organizations.
3 In this essay, we shift away from our three case studies to explore the formal
strategies surrounding UNCITRAL’s production of model laws, and particularly its
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency.7 Because the Model Law mostly
considers procedural aspects of cross-border insolvency practice,8 this exploration
invites comparison to international and transnational texts focused on topics of
private international law (that is, the procedural laws governing these cross-border
insolvency practices), and specifically to comparison of UNCITRAL’s Model Law
to the European Union Regulation on Cross-Border Insolvency.9 Although on each
of these five axes UNCITRAL’s Model Law mostly looked to accomplish “less”
than the EIR, in other ways it arguably also looked to accomplish “more”.
4

United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Legislative Guide on Insolvency, Parts I and
II (2004), available at: <http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf>.
5
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions
(2007), available at:
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/security/Guide_securedtrans.html>.
6
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by
Sea, available at:
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/transport_goods/2008rotterdam_rules.html>. This
convention, commonly referred to as the Rotterdam Rules, has not (yet?) entered into force. At a
diplomatic conference convened to obtain state’s accession to this convention, 25 states signed on. To
date, only three countries have fully ratified their accession – Togo, Congo and Spain; its entry into
force nonetheless requires ratification by 20 states.
7
UNCITRAL
Model
Law
on
Cross-Border
Insolvency (1997),
available
at:
<http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/1997-Model-Law-Insol-2013-Guide-Enactmente.pdf> (referred to hereafter as the “Model Law”).
8
J. Pottow, “Procedural Incrementalism: A Model for International Bankruptcy” (2005) 45(4) Virginia
Journal of International Law 935-1016.
9
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 (29 May 2000), on insolvency proceedings, available at:
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32000R1346&from=en> (hereafter
referred to as the “EIR”). Under EU law, a “regulation” works similar to a multilateral convention. A
regulation is a legal text, which becomes national law within the current 28 Member States with the
European Union without the need for enactment of implementing national legislation. By contrast,
although a “directive” is also a legal text with European-wide implications, it is effectuated only
through the enactment of implementing legislation within each of the Member States’ legislatures. For
general discussion of the distinction between regulations and directives under European law, see, e.g.
N. Siegel, “International Delegations and Principles of Federalism” (2008) 71(1) Law and
Contemporary Problems 93-113, at 109.
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4 It is the “lightness” and “weight” of the Model Law that is the focus of this essay,
which looks to celebrate the long and illustrious scholarly career of Ian Fletcher, an
expert in the private international law (that is, the procedural and other
coordinating rules) of insolvency practices, in the European Insolvency Regulation
(“EIR”) and in the earlier draft EU convention on which the EIR was based.
5 Our argument proceeds in two broad brushstrokes.10 The first part considers both
the Model Law and EIR from the perspective of the five-part typology demarcated
in Chapter 6 of Global Legislators. Based on this analysis, we describe the Model
Law as “private international law-light” (or, “PIL-light”). The second part explains
how this PIL-light may accomplish “more.” It assesses the breadth of possibilities
suggested by the mere procedural coordination of cross-border insolvency
proceedings and practices.

Five Grounds for Comparison
6 Since its emergence in 1968, UNCITRAL has differentiated itself from other
international organizations engaged in private law-making in terms of its
representativeness across geo-political, economic and legal lines, in terms of its
distinct methods of work, and in terms of the broad range of formal strategies
through which it worked.11 Although earlier organizations – UNIDROIT, the
Hague Conference on Private International Law and even the UN’s International
Law Commission – work predominantly (and for many years worked exclusively)
to produce conventions on various topics of private law (whether substantive or
procedural), the UN General Assembly expressly enabled UNCITRAL’s to draft a
broad range of international texts.12
7 Some of the earliest texts promulgated by UNCITRAL were “rules”,13
“recommendations”14 and “legal guides”.15 By 2000, UNCITRAL was engaged in
producing a wide range of legal technologies that included not only conventions,
10

See, e.g. I. Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law (2nd ed) (2007, Oxford University
Press, Oxford).
11
See Block-Lieb and Halliday, above note 1.
12
UN General Assembly Resolution 2205 (XXI) Establishment of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (Dec. 17, 1966), at Part II, paragraph 8(c) (enabling UNCITRAL to prepare or
promote “the adoption of new international conventions, model laws and uniform laws,” as well as
promote “the codification and wider acceptance of international trade terms, provisions, customs and
practices”).
13
See,
e.g.
UNCITRAL
Arbitration
Rules
(1976),
available
at:
<http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rules.pdf>.
14
See UNCITRAL Recommendations on the Legal Value of Computer Records (1985), available at:
<http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/electcom/computerrecords-e.pdf>.
15
See, e.g. UNCITRAL Legal Guide on Electronic Funds Transfers (1987), available at:
<http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/payments/transfers/LG_E-fundstransfer-e.pdf>.
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but also rules, model laws and model legal provisions, legislative guides and a
plethora of explanatory texts.
8 UNCITRAL relied on these distinctive formal strategies to accomplish greater
flexibility than predecessor organizations. Flexibility is a multi-faceted goal,
however. Within the broad range of legal technologies produced by UNCITRAL,
we see an effort to achieve flexibility along five axes: discretion; audience;
direction; detail; and breadth. In the sections that follow, we analyse the Model
Law according to each of these strategies, while at the same time comparing the
Model Law to the EIR.
Discretion
9 A model law differs from a convention in terms of the discretion it offers to
states. A state qua state agrees to be bound to the provisions of a convention. How
a state binds itself to the terms of a convention is a matter of domestic (usually
constitutional) law, much as the question of a corporate signator’s agency to agree
to the terms of a contract is a matter of the corporation’s bylaws and the laws
governing corporate governance and not contract law.16 With a model law, by
contrast, a state accedes to a model law by enacting implementing legislation.
Because the ratification comes in the form of domestic legislation, all implementing
states must act through legislative processes.
10 The EIR binds twenty-seven countries within the European Union.17 Because
this is a regulation and not a directive, it is binding without the need for domestic
legislatures to enact domestic legislation.18 The Model Law is binding on a similar
number of countries, although these enacting states are widely dispersed around the
globe and not concentrated in a single region. Twenty countries have enacted
legislation to implement UNCITRAL’s Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency.19
11 As a consequence of channelling state accession to the provisions of a model
law through statutory implementation, model laws are inherently more discretionary
than conventions. A model law invites domestic legislatures to adopt implementing
16

The domestic law governing accession to the terms of a convention sits outside the terms of the
convention itself, and differs from state to state.
17
Although there twenty-eight nations are members of the European Union, one of these members,
Denmark, is not bound by the terms of the EIR. See G. Moss and I. Fletcher, The EC Regulation on
Insolvency Proceedings: A Commentary and Annotated Guide (2009, Oxford University Press,
Oxford).
18
Ibid.
19
UNCITRAL identifies the following twenty countries as having implemented the Model Law:
Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Greece, Japan, Mauritius, Mexico, Montenegro, New Zealand,
Philippines, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Uganda, United
Kingdom (including British Virgin Islands), and United States. See UNCITRAL, Status Model Law on
Cross-Border Insolvency (1997), available at:
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_status.html>.
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legislation, but legislatures are by no means bound by the terms of offer. As a
result, domestic legislation might implement a model law although this legislation
also incorporates non-uniform provisions that are distinct from the provisions of the
model law.20 Conventions are not subject to this sort of non-uniform accession,
however. In addition, domestic legislatures are freer to amend or repeal legislation
enacted to implement a model law than to amend or repeal involvement in a
convention; de-accession from a convention is an international event governed by
international law, but repeal of domestic legislation enacted to implement a model
law is purely a matter of domestic law.
12 The discretionary nature of a convention or model law is not simply a
consequence of how these are ratified; it also partly follows from how they are
written. A convention might be drafted so that some of its provisions offer
discretion to the states that ratify it. Although generally a convention is drafted so
that it employs an imperative rhetoric, a convention may also contain a handful of
provisions that states are invited to ratify separately. For example, two chapters of
provisions within the Rotterdam Rules – one on arbitration and another on
jurisdiction – must be separately acceded to in order to govern a ratifying State. 21
13 Alternatively, a convention might be conceived as presenting a “hub” of
provisions that might apply across multiple related protocols such that a State is
invited to ratify the central convention and at least one but not all of the related
protocols. The Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile
Equipment presents an example of this sort of “hub and spoke” convention, with
current protocols on aircraft, spacecraft, rolling stock and another protocol on
agricultural equipment in the making.22 Finally, a convention may be crafted to
allow private parties to contract around its terms. The UN’s Convention on the
International Sale of Goods, for example, allows parties to opt out of its application
by specifying contractually that some law other than the CISG governs the terms of
their transaction.23 Similarly, the Rotterdam Rules permit parties to a “volume
contract” to deviate from certain of its provisions.24
14 A model law might similarly be drafted to invite this sort of discretion.
Embedded within a model law may be provisions that offer multiple options to

20

These non-uniform enactments might look to accommodate distinct aspects of domestic law so that
the model law fits better with the domestic legal regime into which it is inserted. Alternatively, nonuniform domestic enactments might reject some aspect of a model law although accepting the
remainder of its provisions.
21
See Rotterdam Rules, above note 6, at Chapters 14 and 15.
22
See Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment (commonly referred to as the “Cape
Town Convention”), available at: <http://www.unidroit.org/instruments/security-interests/cape-townconvention>.
23
See United Nations Conventions on International Sales of Goods, available at:
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG.html>.
24
See Rotterdam Rules, above note 6.
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States. For example, the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Credit Transfers
offers both a choice of law provision and a substantive provision in footnotes to
Articles 1 and 19 that “states might wish to adopt”.25 Alternatively, a model law
may contain bracketed language intended to invite variation in implementing
domestic legislation. UNCITRAL’s Model Laws on Electronic Commerce contains
a number of provisions that invite enacting states to specify in their implementing
legislation transactions that sit outside its scope.26
15 Although a convention may contain permissive provisions, most provisions in a
convention are drafted with the sort of precise, imperative language that allows a
State to understand the terms to which they have agreed to be bound. The EIR, like
most conventions, is drafted with this sort of imperative language that offers little
discretion to Member States.
16 By contrast, the Model Law leaves discretion for enacting states. Although
twenty nations have enacted legislation to implement the Model Law, the precise
language of these statutes differs from country to country. Some of this variation
was invited by UNCITRAL in the way in which it drafted the Model Law, and
some is a consequence of the structure of the domestic insolvency laws into which
these cross-border provisions were added. For example, Article 23(1) of the Model
Law provides that:
Upon recognition of a foreign proceeding, the foreign representative has standing to initiate
[refer to the types of action to avoid or otherwise render ineffective acts detrimental to
creditors that are available in this State to a person or body administering a reorganization or
liquidation].

17 This bracketed language virtually requires legislatures in an Enacting State to
exercise flexibility in determining the extent of a foreign representative’s authority
to bring an avoidance action in the recognizing state.27

Audience
18 Variations in discretion are sometimes accomplished by altering the audience to
whom an international instrument is directed. For example, when an international
organization drafts a model law it invites engagement with domestic legislatures.
Although members of the executive and judicial branches of a state may be

25

See UNCITRAL Model Law on International Credit Transfers (1994), available at:
<http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/payments/transfers/ml-credittrans.pdf>.
26
See, e.g. Article 12(2), UNCITRAL’s Model Laws on Electronic Commerce (“The provisions of this
article
do
not
apply
to
the
following:
[.....].”)
(1999),
available
at:
<http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/electcom/05-89450_Ebook.pdf>.
27
For discussion of this discretion, see UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency Guide to
Enactment (1997), at paragraphs 165-167.
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involved (ex ante) in the drafting and (ex post) in the interpretation of a model law,
the legislative branch of an enacting state holds veto over whether a model law will
be implemented at all. The Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency is directed to
domestic legislatures in this way. Because the EIR was drafted as a regulation and
not a directive, it limits the discretion that might be exercised by national
legislatures in Member States.28
19 Legislatures are not the only audience to which an international text might get
directed, however. International law-making organizations might draft a text to
create judicial discretion by incorporating open-ended standards rather than bright
line rules into the terms of the text.29 Article 35(2) of the CISG provides that goods
do not “conform” to a contract unless they are “fit for the purposes to which goods
of the same description would ordinarily be used”, and Article 49 provides that a
buyer may declare a contract “avoided” if “the failure by the seller to perform any
of his obligations under the contract amounts to a fundaments breach of contract.”
The determination of either standard rests, nearly entirely, within the discretion of
the judge hearing the parties’ dispute.
20 Alternatively, UNCITRAL and other international law-making organizations
might include within a text directed to a state (or its legislative or judicial branches)
provisions intended to delegate discretion to private parties – that is, default rules
that permit private parties to opt-out of the terms of the convention or model law as
a matter of contract. For example, the CISG broadly invites private parties to opt
out of its applicability.30 The Rotterdam Rules similarly validate “volume
contracts” containing provisions that deviate from specified provisions of that
convention.31 International law-making organizations might also draft a text so that
it is directed to private parties. UNCITRAL refers to a legal technology as “rules”
or “a practice guide” when it looks to speak directly to contract parties, litigants or
other private actors.32 Its Arbitration Rules present an example of the former;
UNCITRAL has promulgated practice guides on issues relating to procurement and
international agreements (i.e., protocols). 33
21 Both the Model Law and EIR refer to a debtor’s “centre of main interests” as a
key standard for coordination of cross-border insolvency proceedings.34 This

28

See text associated with above note 9.
A convention might also reserve judicial discretion institutionally by specifying the location of
dispute resolution. For example, a convention might include international agreement on resolution of
specified disputes. See Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes, available at:
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm>.
30
CISG, above note 23, at Article 6: “The parties may exclude the application of this Convention or,
subject to Article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions.”
31
See Rotterdam Rules, above note 6.
32
See text associated with above notes 13-15.
33
Idem.
34
Article 16(3), Model Law, above note 7; EIR, above note 9.
29
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COMI standard is not defined in either international text. Language in the preamble
paragraphs to the EIR suggest key attributes of a debtor’s COMI;35 UNCITRAL’s
Guide to Enactment and Interpretation of the Model Law similarly offer guidance
in interpreting this open-ended standard.36 Nonetheless, in both instances, courts
hold substantial discretion to fill in the details of this definition. Other provisions of
the Model Law (which are absent from the EIR) delegate additional discretion to
recognizing courts: for example, the provisions of the Model Law requiring courts
and foreign representatives to cooperate and coordinate to the maximum extent
possible contain no further direction on how this discretion should be exercised.
22 One important difference exists between the judicial discretion delegated in the
EIR and in the Model Law: With the EIR, a domestic court’s interpretation of a
debtor’s COMI is subject to review by the European Court of Justice; with
legislation enacted to implement the Model Law, there exists no centralized,
international court to sit in review of domestic courts’ interpretations, even when
they sit in tension with each other.37
Breadth
23 There is no denying that the Model Law covers less ground than the EIR. On
several topics on which the EIR provides detailed direction, the Model Law is
completely silent.
24 The EIR is built like a typical private international law convention. PIL rules
typically govern (up to) three topics: jurisdiction; applicable law; the recognition
and enforcement of judgments. The EIR contains provisions involving all three of
these conventional PIL topics, and adds a fourth: the recognition of the opening
and course of insolvency proceedings (a topic distinct from the recognition of a
judgment entered as a consequence of closing or resolving a proceeding). By
contrast, the Model Law addresses only one of the four topics covered by the EIR.
The Model Law speaks to the recognition of the opening of insolvency proceedings
in another country, the “fourth leg” of the EIR referred to above, but not applicable
law or enforcement judgments.

35

See Preamble at paragraph 13, EIR, above note 9.
Part G, UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency and Guide to Enactment, at paragraphs
30-31. A copy of the Guide to Enactment is attached to the Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law as an
Annex. See above note 4. In 2010, UNCITRAL subsequently revised and renamed this as a Guide to
Enactment and Interpretation. See above note 7.
37
UNCITRAL’s Model Law directs courts’ attention to international interpretation, but this direction
offers little guarantee of uniform judicial interpretation of its provisions. See Article 8, Model Law,
above note 7.
36
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25 The Model Law does not purport to address what law should govern an
insolvency proceeding or any dispute arising within the proceeding.38 It is
completely silent on this topic.39 Nor does it limit jurisdiction to open insolvency
proceedings governing a debtor. It refers indirectly to the issue of jurisdiction by
considering the topic through the lens of recognition of the opening and conduct of
insolvency proceedings; this recognition is permitted only as pertains to insolvency
proceedings pending in the State in which the debtor’s COMI is situated (in which
case, these are recognized a foreign main proceedings) or insolvency proceedings
in the State in which an establishment of the debtor is situated (in which case, these
are recognized as foreign non-main proceedings).40 The Model Law also specifies
the (personal) jurisdiction – that is, the standing – of the foreign representative
appointed by the court that has opened proceedings (either where the debtor’s
COMI or an establishment of the debtor is located), but does not otherwise speak to
the jurisdiction of an insolvency representative, whether appointed by a court in the
“enacting state” or in a state other than the state in which the foreign representative
has been appointed. Nor does the Model Law expressly govern the circumstances
under which judgments entered in the context of such an insolvency proceeding
should be recognized or enforced.41
26 Because of these differences from the EIR, we refer to the Model Law as “PILlight”. The Model Law covers none of the three typical topics covered by a PIL
convention. Instead, it predominately addresses the fourth PIL variant added with
the EIR – recognition of the opening and course of insolvency proceedings.42

38

See Guide to Enactment, above note 36, paragraph 3, at 19: “The Model Law respects the differences
among national procedural laws and does not attempt a substantive unification of insolvency law.”
Note also the UNCITRAL’s Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law contains several non-binding
recommendations on this topic, although even these are more architectural and imperative. See
Insolvency Guide, above note 4, at Recommendations 30-34.
39
Because the Model Law is silent on the topic, the insolvency law applicable in an ancillary
proceeding is likely to be the insolvency law of the state in which the recognizing court is situated. See
Guide to Enactment, above note 36, at paragraph 143: “Recognition, therefore, has its own effects
rather than importing the consequences of the foreign law into the insolvency system of the enacting
State.” Some domestic legislation enacted to implement the Model Law makes this clear; other
countries’ implementing legislation leaves the issue for resolution under other legislation (such as the
private international law rules governing in the recognizing court) or legal rules (such as the common
law rules applicable there).
40
Domestic rules governing jurisdiction to open an insolvency proceeding remain unchanged and
might well extend beyond a debtor’s COMI or establishment.
41
While it directs that courts recognizing the opening of insolvency proceedings pending in a debtor’s
COMI or establishment should cooperate and coordinate with the court(s) in the jurisdiction in which
the proceeding was opened, it does not specify that this cooperation must extend to the recognition of
judgments entered in that proceeding. While this broad language might be construed to permit such
recognition and enforcement, it does not expressly require it. See Rubin et al v. Eurofinance SA [2012]
UKSC 46.
42
And this fourth topic, the recognition of the opening of insolvency proceedings, is novel to the EIR
and sat outside the scope of a typical PIL convention.
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27 In addition and distinct from the EIR, the Model Law layers on top of this
concept of the recognition of the opening of an insolvency proceeding an obligation
for recognizing courts to cooperate and coordinate with an opening court and with
the insolvency representative appointed by the opening court. This obligation to
“coordinate and cooperate” is largely undefined within the Model Law and, as
such, delegates substantial discretion to “recognizing courts”.43 These obligations
constitute open-ended standards that provide domestic courts substantial discretion
regarding the conduct of multiple cross-border insolvency proceedings.
Detail
28 Even on those topics covered both in the Model Law and EIR, the provisions of
the EIR are more detailed and precise.
29 Take first the topic of recognition of the opening and course of an insolvency
proceeding. Both the EIR and Model Law couch recognition on the debtor’s
connection to the opening state – and extend additional deference to proceedings
entered in the state in which a debtor’s COMI is located (the so-called “main
proceeding”) than that extended to proceedings entered in a state in which a
debtor’s establishment is located (referred to by the EIR as a “secondary
proceeding” and a “foreign nonmain proceeding” in the Model Law). While the
definition of establishment is virtually identical in both international instruments, 44
the EIR provides recognizing courts with greater guidance on the concept of a
debtor’s COMI than does the Model Law. Importantly, language in the preamble
paragraphs to the EIR direct that the facts establishing a debtor’s COMI are those
readily observable to third parties.45 This language nowhere appears on the
provisions of the Model Law or in its Guide to Enactment. Although language
situated in preamble paragraphs describing the purposes of the EIR would seem
relatively insignificant and unlikely to be controlling, this language has become
central to definition of a debtor’s COMI under the EIR, especially since the
European Court of Justice emphasized the importance of objective indicators of
this standard that are observable to third parties.46
30 Moreover, while the definitions of “foreign proceeding” and “foreign
representative” in the Model Law are very similar to the definitions for “insolvency
proceeding” and “liquidator” in the EIR, these concepts are more fully defined in
the EIR than in the Model Law. In the EIR, the term “insolvency proceeding” is not
simply defined but also connected to Annexes A and B to the text, which set out
agreed upon lists of Member States’ “main proceedings” and “secondary

43

See Articles 25-27, 29-30, Model Law, above note 7.
Compare Article 2(f), Model Law, above note 7, with Article 2(h), EIR, above note 9.
45
See Preamble, EIR, above note 9, at paragraph 13.
46
In the matter of Eurofood IFSC Ltd. (Case No. C-341/04) (4 May 2006).
44
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proceedings” governed by the terms of the Regulation.47 Similarly, Annex C to the
EIR specifies those insolvency representatives that are “liquidators” entitled to
automatic recognition under its terms.48 The Model Law contains no similar listings
to clarify the defined terms.49

Less is More With the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency
31 The previous section compared UNCITTRAL’s Model Law to the EIR through
the lens of a four-part typology of formal strategies (discretion; audience; breadth
and detail). There, we found that the Model Law is less hard, less broad, and less
detailed than the EIR, and that it is directed to solely domestic legislatures and not
states generally. It is, we claim, PIL-light, whereas the EIR is a proper PIL
convention. In this section, we argue that UNCITRAL’s Model Law accomplishes
“more” despite these paucities. We see “more” as measured in at least three ways:
range; substance; decision-making; and incremental effect.
32 First, UNCITRAL’s Model Law looks to set international standards on the
coordination of cross-border insolvency proceedings, not merely regional ones.
This breadth is more than simply geographic. It applies across a range of economic,
political and cultural interests. Nearly all of the EU’s Member States are rich by
any standard. They are also nearly uniformly organized as liberal democracies. By
contrast, the Model Law must accommodate not just Western interests in
insolvency law, but also the potentially distinct goals embedded in Asian, South
American and African laws of this sort, if its adoption is to occur globally and not
just episodically, for example in the OECD members states. The EIR looks to mesh
interests embedded in a range of Continental civilian legal codes, which view
bankruptcy and insolvency laws as fundamentally procedural, with those of the
United Kingdom, whose bankruptcy and insolvency laws derive from practices
developed by courts of equity, but only as relates to a unified European market.
UNCITRAL’s Model Law looks to coordinate insolvency laws affecting trade
throughout the world – including perhaps especially US corporate reorganization
law. The US Chapter 11 differs in important ways from every other country’s
insolvency laws; the EIR could safely ignore this important outlier but the Model
Law needed to address American interests head on.
33 This brings us, second, to issues of substance. Neither the EIR nor
UNCITRAL’s Model Law looked to harmonize insolvency law. When these were
promulgated, insolvency laws were too different from each other to consider such a
goal, even solely within Europe. Although the Model Law says less about the goals
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of insolvency law, it accomplishes “more” by remaining open about the objectives
of a secondary (that is, a nonmain) proceeding. While the EIR provides that the
sole purpose for secondary proceedings (certainly those commenced after the
opening of a main proceeding in the location of a debtor’s COMI) is the winding up
of a debtor’s establishment within the territory of “secondary” jurisdiction,50 the
Model Law remains silent on the purpose of nonmain proceedings. In several
places in the Guide to Enactment, provisions of the Model Law are described as
accommodating the interests of both liquidation and reorganization proceedings.51
By remaining agnostic on the proper goals of a nonmain proceeding, practitioners
and commentators were free to describe their vision of the Model Law as a means
for main, nonmain and other ancillary proceedings to work together to assist in a
reorganization of the debtor.52
34 Third, this substantive multi-directionalism accomplished important benefits,
both in terms of decision-making inside the working group’s deliberations and
implementation of the Model Law by national legislatures. The US delegation
holds an important position within UNCITRAL, given the centrality of its
economic and political circumstances; US delegates were unlikely to join in a
project on coordinating cross-border insolvency practice unless the Model Law was
fully to accept US Chapter 11 corporate reorganization proceedings as entitled to
recognition. But in the late 1990s, when the Model Law was drafted, corporate
reorganization was nowhere near the global norm; for the Model Law to be
implemented broadly around the globe, its embrace of reorganization practices
must be quiet (that is, referred to only within the Guide to Enactment) and coupled
with equally enthusiastic endorsements of the coordination of liquidation
proceedings as its goal.
35 Finally, the Model Law accomplished “more” with “less” because it set the table
for subsequent work on drafting international standards on corporate insolvency
laws.
36 After promulgation of the Model Law, UNCITRAL continued efforts to
promote corporate reorganization as preferable to corporate liquidation. Within a
few short years after having promulgated the Model Law, UNCITRAL also
published its Legislative Guide on Insolvency, which more explicitly recommended
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this preference for corporation reorganization. It would have been far more difficult
for UNCITRAL to set international standards on corporate insolvency law that
emphasize corporate reorganization over corporate liquidation if the Model Law
had not, first, allowed corporate reorganization laws into the definition of “foreign
proceedings” entitled to recognition.
37 Revision of the EIR is not impossible, but this work has proceeded in fits and
starts, and mostly following in the wake of the current financial crisis, as distinct
from the incremental progress UNCITRAL has made on corporate insolvency law
standard setting. Nonetheless, the Regulation does mandate reflection and reports
that allow for the possibility of revision within the scope of this transnational
agreement. Recently, this review process has produced proposals for revision of the
EIR; alongside proposals to revise the EIR, the European Commission also has
promulgated a report on the possibility of achieving greater convergence on the
insolvency laws within Europe.53 In making these proposals, reports out of the
European Commission and European Parliament point to UNCITRAL as an
inspiration.

Conclusion
38 The Model Law looks for new procedural solutions, whereas the EIR stuck with
a century-old format. The EIR, while not exactly a convention, still follows the
format of PIL conventions that had been hammered out in the Hague and at other
diplomatic conferences convened since at least the 1890s. PIL conventions have
had limited success, however, with most of these success stories limited to PIL
conventions adopted within the European Union. The Hague Conference on Private
International Law has promulgated dozens of PIL conventions since the late
nineteenth century, but despite the decades spent in negotiating these instruments
only a few of them have entered into force.54 The EU has had greater success with
regional PIL conventions, but regional agreement on matters of procedure is no
guarantee that similar sorts of conventions will succeed on a broader transnational
or international basis.
39 UNCITRAL’s decision to draft the Model Law with less breadth, less depth and
less detail than typical PIL conventions was, thus, an intentional move toward “PIL
light.” Global agreement on jurisdictional rules for opening an insolvency
proceeding and choice of law rules for determining what laws should govern such a
proceeding were rejected as unlikely given the substantive dissensus among
insolvency laws around the world. Nor did UNCITRAL’s working group on
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insolvency law agree on express standards for enforcing and recognizing the
judgments emerging out of an insolvency context. But there was an important
kernel of agreement that the working group thought might work on an international
basis. Inspired by the draft EU Convention’s novel distinction between recognition
of the “commencement and course” of an insolvency proceeding, and recognition
of the ultimate judgments entered as a result of such proceedings, UNCITRAL’s
Model Law set out model legal provisions for streamlined recognition of crossborder insolvency proceedings.
40 Although it did not adopt a provision in the Model Law that resembled Article
25 of the EIR, UNCITRAL’s insolvency working group did agree on the basic
parameters of what recognition of the opening of a proceeding should involve, and
on additional orders that the recognizing court might determine to be appropriate
depending on the circumstances of the foreign proceedings (including whether the
foreign proceeding was deemed to be a “main” or “nonmain” proceeding). For
example, automatically upon recognition of a foreign main proceeding, the Model
Law would stay “commencement or continuation of individual actions or individual
proceedings concerning the debtor’s assets, rights, obligations or liabilities,” as
well as execution against the debtor’s assets; it would also “suspend” a debtor’s
“right to transfer, encumber or otherwise dispose of any assets.” 55 Moreover, the
working group included within the Model Law provisions requiring cooperation “to
the maximum extent possible,” and did not condition this obligation of cooperation
on recognition of a foreign proceeding.56 Although the Model Law did not attempt
to define the limits of this cooperation, it did provide examples of it; 57 the Guide to
Enactment generally describes an important goal of this cooperation as including
especially the reorganization of a viable corporate debtor’s business operations. 58
The Guide’s emphasis on the importance that the Model Law facilitate cross-border
cooperation and the reorganization of a multinational corporation was somewhat
controversial in that there were, at the time the Model Law was promulgated,
corporate reorganization was nowhere near the global norm.
41 But this Model Law built on the notion of “PIL light” was just enough PIL to
accomplish more than a formal PIL convention would have done. A PIL convention
on cross-border insolvency might well have grown dusty in the drawers of
interested state actors (ignored and not entered into force), as had been the case
with many earlier PIL conventions. A model law, which vests more discretion in
sovereign hands than a convention, on only a few of the traditional topics of private
international law, eschewing especially any effort to reach agreement on difficult
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topics of jurisdiction and applicable law, involved just enough PIL to catch the
attention of key national actors.
42 Quick enactments by South Africa, Japan and Mexico might have been ignored
by the international community, but the Model Law’s adoption by the US in 2005
paved the way for other legislative efforts – by Canada, Australia, and the United
Kingdom, but not only by common law countries. Important civil law countries –
such as the Republic of Korea – demonstrated that the Model Law might be made
to work outside the common law. Practice within the UK, which was also bound to
the terms of the EIR, showed the fundamental consistency between the EIR and
Model Law. Recent review of practices under both the EIR and Model Law,
revisions to the Guide to Enactment and Interpretation of the Model Law, and
proposals to reform the EIR all build on the foundational similarities between the
two.
43 Although most commentators focus on the Model Law’s heft and weight – its
move toward setting international standards for corporate insolvency law and,
specifically, its focus on facilitating corporate reorganization – this essay has
concentrated on the role of the Model Law as a set of “light” rules on private
international law for cross-border insolvency practice. We have argued that the
Model Law’s lightness accomplishes “more,” both as relates to UNCITRAL’s
decision-making on the Model Law as well as its later work on corporate
insolvency law norm, and to national determinations to enact implementing
legislation.
44 While the EIR achieved formal transnational agreement on the topic of crossborder insolvency, the flexible pragmatism embedded in the Model Law left
“more” room for coordination across a greater range of legal dissensus. Unlike the
EIR, which governs only insolvency proceedings within Europe, UNCITRAL’s
Model Law looked to set international standards on the topic. Unlike the EIR,
which as initially drafted identifies liquidation of an establishment as the only
purpose of a “secondary” insolvency proceeding, UNCITRAL’s Model Law is
instead framed intentionally to promote the possibility of a corporate
reorganization. All this, and more. Time will tell the full extent to which the Model
Law facilitates coordination of global insolvency practice.
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